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In the thirteenth century Western Europe rediscovered Aristotle. Very soon, and thanks 
largely to the scholarship of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle entered the pantheon of 
classical originators of Western ideas. Indeed, Aristotle’s views on government became 
the basis of an intellectual revolution, supported by the Church, that played up the moral 
value of political life. Yet, the classical texts also contained a second tradition. This 
second tradition is a crucial cornerstone of our thinking about political organisation 
today. The books that contained the literary side of this tradition were not works of 
philosophy, but histories of great deeds. These histories spoke to the concerns, 
prejudices and goals of Early Modern state-builders, and led directly not only to the idea 
of the modern state, but also to its cosmopolitan rivals. Modern warfare and human 
rights; bureaucratic government and multiculturalism; the World Trade Organisation and 
Oxfam: all trace their roots to this, the most persuasive and long-lasting legacy of the 
ancient world. So persuasive are its doctrines that we have ceased to see them as an 
invention of a time and place. 
 Texts on the history of political theory often stress that there is a sharp break 
between Aristotle and the later Roman and medieval approaches to politics.1 Yet, 
despite this realisation, this discontinuity is skipped across with alacrity. For most 
political theorists Aristotle gives way cleanly to the more universalist ideas associated 
with imperial Rome, the Church triumphant, and some even cut straight to Machiavelli. 
Very little attention is given to the political theory of empire constructed by Alexander 
the Great, his biographers and successors, despite the fact that it was Alexander who 
finally abolished the cosy closed world associated with Aristotle’s ideal. Alexander had 
been Aristotle’s pupil, and Aristotle’s great paean to the perfection of the ideal polis,2 
his Politics, was written at a time when the new Macedonian empire was rewriting the 
rules and categories of politics. This article argues that it is Alexander, not Aristotle, that 
is the founder of the western political tradition, and that the idea of empire, and 
imperialist political organisation, forms the core of what it means to be western. We can 
trace this idea back to the Macedonians and Romans. In this sense, the ‘classical Greeks’ 
are an aberration in the development of the idea of the West. More controversially, it 
also implies that the idea of the West is at its roots an imperial and military legacy. Just 
as capitalism in Marx made socialism possible, so rampant military imperialism has also 
given us cosmopolitanism and racial tolerance.  
 My argument is that it was the political organisation of the Macedonian military, 
developed by Philip of Macedon, that formed the basis of Alexander the Great’s notion 
of empire. This, in turn, formed the template of future Near Eastern and Mediterranean 
polities; and through the influential histories of Arrian, Quintus Curtius, Caesar, 
Plutarch, Tacitus and Livy became the model for European state creation from the high 
Middle Ages onwards. Aristotle’s politics was based upon civic virtue, while 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Sabine and Thorson, (1973: 141): ‘In the history of political philosophy the death of 
Aristotle in 322 marks the close of an era, as the life of his great pupil… marks the beginning of a new era 
in politics… The failure of the city-state is drawn like a sharp line across the history of political thought, 
whereas from this date forward its continuity is unbroken down to our own day.’ Despite this Sabine and 
Thorson never address Alexander’s ideas and achievements directly. 
2
 The polis, usually rendered into English by the unhelpful phrase city-state, was the basic political 
community of the classical Greeks. It was based around a community of small farmers, a face-to-face 
system of government, a citizen militia and aspired to self-sufficiency. I will discuss this in more detail in 
the section on Aristotle. 
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Alexander’s relied on an instrumental rationality that had its roots in Macedonian 
military doctrine. Position and authority were judged by their effectiveness. Equally, 
imperial policies required a sophisticated use and understanding of inter-cultural 
relations. From this came Alexander’s notions of cosmopolitanism, which influenced the 
Stoics and Roman imperial policy. Opponents of militarism, like the Stoic Zeno and 
later pacifists, looked not to Aristotle’s territorially limited vision, but rather to the 
instrumental rationality and cosmopolitanism of their militaristic adversaries. The 
Macedonian system became the template for empire in the ancient world, and was 
adopted consciously and explicitly by the Parthians, Sassanid Persians, Carthaginians 
and Romans. The Romans and Persians guaranteed that these imperial practices were 
transferred to the Muslim and Christian worlds, and we clearly see a firm Macedonian 
influence (through its imitators and developers) in the writings of Ibn Khaldun in the 
fourteenth century and Francesco Guicciardini in the fifteenth. By the sixteenth century 
European writers were using the histories of empire as a template for the reform and 
development of what was to become the state. In this process Alexander and Caesar 
became the exemplars of the perfect and just ruler. Alfonso V of Aragon even claimed 
to have been cured of an illness by reading Quintus Curtius Rufus’ History of Alexander 
(Heckel, 1984: 14) While Tacitus and his histories were more commonly quoted, 
especially in relation to the relevance of the rule of Tiberius for sixteenth century state-
builders, it is still to Alexander that we owe the first clear development of this idea of 
empire in the western canon. 
In sum, Aristotle’s ideas are left behind. Alexander’s greatest impact on the 
world was to reformulate the major political debate about the right way to live. 
Aristotle’s ideas remain a yearning amongst conservatives. It becomes a living fossil 
that is picked up by advocates of Senatorial class power in late Republican Rome, but is 
unable to survive the populist (and military-based) revolution of Caesar. It is picked up 
again by the Church at the end of the Middle Ages as a shield against the new 
humanism. Again, it fails to prevent the popularity of a political doctrine associated with 
the historian Tacitus. Even Machiavelli’s attempt to revive the civic virtue of the Roman 
Senatorial party broke against the imperial policies of Spain and France. Thus, the 
military revolution at the close of the Greek classical age is crucial to an understanding 
of modern political organisation. In order to develop this argument I have divided this 
paper up into three sections. The first looks at Aristotle’s legacy, and is intended to show 
why he fits poorly with the development of our own western tradition of organisation. 
The second section looks at the development of the Macedonian military model, 
concentrating on the reforms of Philip. The third traces the Macedonian systems’ move 
from militarised kingdom to empire, and the profound changes this had on political 
organisation. Key here is the development of a Western ideology of empire.  
 
 
ARISTOTLE’S XENOPHOBIC IDEAL 
 
 Aristotle was a polymath, with interests that stretched from ethics and politics to 
biology, estate management and midwifery. In a sense this is not strange, since for 
Aristotle there was a unity amongst all these subjects, linked to the divine, which holds 
the cosmos in order. As befits a man who believed in a static cosmic order, Aristotle was 
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a conservative. While criticising many practices of his own time, he was nevertheless 
largely happy with the institutions of his day; and like many conservatives saw political 
institutions of the best kind as forming a sort of organic whole (Ar. Pol, Bk VII, ch. 8). 
Although there was an interconnectedness of things, this did not mean that each of the 
parts were equal. Indeed, there is a strict hierarchy of disciplines, as well as institutions. 
Key to our analysis is his view that ethics is subordinate to politics (Ar. NE, Bk I, ch. 3). 
Now, it should be pointed out at the start that Aristotle’s notion of the idea of politics is 
different to our own. The word Politeia, which also forms the root of the original title 
for Aristotle’s Politics: politikos, refers to a collection of people forming a community, 
and implies that they are linked together by a constitution. In this sense it is closer to the 
latin civitas, from which we get our word city. This is important. Aristotle is writing 
about the life of a city. Yet, while to us a city means any sprawling mass of urban 
growth, to Aristotle it meant a set of social relations that could only exist under certain 
conditions. It comes closer, therefore, to the definition of town or city found in the 
United States, where it implies self-government, rather than size or contiguity of 
urbanisation. 
 Aristotle’s own definition of a politeia comes in the crucial Book VII of The 
Politics: 
 
Here then we have ready to hand the best definition of a city: it must 
have a population large enough to cater for all the needs of a self-
sufficient existence, but not so large that it cannot be easily supervised 
(Ar. Pol, Bk VII, ch. 4). 
 
This notion of balance fits in with Aristotle’s own ethics, where every virtue is a 
mean between two extremist vices (Ar. NE, Bk II, chs 6-7), and it also outlines the 
purposes of the city. It is to provide the citizen with all he3 wants in terms of physical 
needs, but also be well governed in order to satisfy the citizen’s moral and intellectual 
needs. This latter set of needs involves living the ‘good life’, which is defined as one 
that is spiritually happy.4 So what should the politeia look like? Here a discussion of the 
upper limit is important for our purposes. A politeia becomes ungovernable when its 
population reaches such a size that the citizens can no longer know each other by sight. 
At this stage the election of individuals to the various magistracies becomes unworkable, 
as the vast bulk of the electorate is unable to know if the candidate they are voting for 
really is the best for the job. Similarly, military command becomes too complex, as no 
one polemarch (the magistrate in charge of leadership in war) can make themselves 
heard to all the soldiery. Finally, in a large city, where people do not know each other, it 
is easy for foreign residents to pass themselves off as citizens – a problem that only has 
meaning when we take into account Aristotle’s racial theories, discussed below(Ar. Pol, 
Bk VII, ch. 4). Earlier Aristotle had classed Babylon as a ‘nation’ rather than a city, 
because it was unable to form a coherent institutional unit. He points out that after its 
capture (presumably by Alexander) parts of Babylon were still unaware of it two days 
later(AR. Pol, Bk III, ch. 3). 
                                                          
3
 Aristotle only referred to men as full participating citizens. 
4
 This issue of the true nature of happiness is covered in Book I of The Nicomachean Ethics. 
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 This all leads to why Aristotle sees this issue of scale as important. The Politeia 
has an ethical purpose, and that purpose can only be served if it is well governed. He 
begins his Nicomachean Ethics with the famous line ‘It is thought that every activity… 
has for its object the attainment of some good’(Ar. NE, Bk 1, ch. 1). The good of the 
politeia was the attainment of happiness of the individual citizens. For these citizens to 
be happy they needed education in the right way to live. Such education could only 
come within a politeia that had good laws and was properly governed by the best in 
society. Yet, education for Aristotle is not, as it is for Plato, largely an exercise in 
personal self-discovery. Rather, much of it would be about the development of custom 
and habit. It is the wise educators who decide what the virtuous mean is, rather than 
each individual citizen. Training and education is, therefore, not about conscious choice, 
but about the passing on of customs that make life pleasant and workable for the 
individual.5 In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle reinforces this point by stating that: 
 
For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the 
individual, the good of the community is clearly a greater and more 
perfect good both to get and to keep (Ar. NE, Bk I, ch. 2). 
 
 To modern ears this may sound harsh, but we must remember the context of the 
classical Greek politeia. Aristotle neatly summarises its ethos, and its telos, when he 
says ‘that man is by nature a political [ie: polis-dwelling] animal; it is his nature to live 
in a state [politeia]. He who by his nature… has no city, no state, is either too bad or too 
good, either sub-human, or super-human’ (Ar. Pol, Book I, ch. 2). To conform to our 
human nature, and therefore to be happy, requires us to live in a politeia, and our 
education should reflect this. According to Aristotle we need to be taught to want what 
is best for us through custom. The isolated individual (the word for individual, or private 
person, in Greek was idiotes, from which we get our word idiot) ceases to be properly 
human, and lives in a constant state of war. There is, therefore, an imperative to defend 
the politeia, since it is the highest human ideal, from internal and external threats to its 
cohesion. The tools for this are education, laws and custom. 
 This leads to another important stage of Aristotle’s argument. Custom must be 
maintained by a strong civic virtue. This calls for extremely high levels of group 
cohesion, and consequently the politeia must also be small in scale. Civic virtue and 
patriotism within the various Hellenic communities are bolstered by a natural racial 
superiority, and by strict family and gender roles. Barbarians are naturally inferior for 
two reasons. First, they are environmentally sub-human because they do not live, or 
desire to live, in a politeia. Second, because of various reasons, including climate, they 
lack the proper mix of intelligence and courage. Barbarians are naturally slaves, a point 
made clear by their frequent inability to recognise the inferiority of the female (the slave 
by nature is on the same social level as the female, and therefore does not appreciate the 
difference between slave and female and male and female).6 As a result, barbarians have 
unnatural family relationships. Having established the superiority of the Hellene 
                                                          
5
 This forms a central tenet of C. E. M. Joad’s interpretation of Aristotle (Joad, nd: 103). Much of this is 
discussed at the end of Book VII and Book VIII of The Politics, although elements appear elsewhere in 
Aristotle’s writings. 
6
 For Aristotle’s racial theories see Ar. Politics Bk I, ch. 2 and Bk VII, ch. 7 
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Aristotle goes on to reject pan-Hellenism too. Hellenes should form a plethora of poleis, 
since only through a politeia can we live a proper life. In order to keep the bonds strong, 
therefore, even Hellenes from another politeia should be excluded from citizenship. A 
system of free-floating citizenship, based purely on residence, would weaken the bonds 
of the close-knit community.7 Thus, high levels of cohesion are maintained by the 
smallness of communities, by their strong sense of racial superiority towards foreigners, 
by bonds of kinship and face-to-face community, and by inflexible family structures. 
 It is my contention, therefore, that Aristotle’s views on foreigners, barbarians 
and women are not mere unfortunate additions to his moral and political philosophy, but 
instead a crucial part of it. His ideas of moderation, custom and xenophobia are all 
integral to his view of the proper way for people to live. It is a deliberately non-
cosmopolitan political theory. Certainly, his communities have all the advantages of the 
conservative organic society. They do not desire conquest, and the members of the 
politeia are secure in their identity, ethics and telos. In this sense, Aristotle perfectly 
encapsulated the form and function of the classical Greek polis. Although much is made 
of the Athenian and Spartan ‘empires’ in modern historical commentaries, it is important 
to point out that not only were these aberrations for the vast majority of Hellenes, they 
also bore little resemblance to what we (or the Macedonians and Romans) would call 
empires. They were based on a mix of voluntary and involuntary alliances, which in the 
Athenian case included the new idea of tribute in lieu of military contribution. In other 
words, even the most imperialist of the classical Hellenes maintained both the form and 
substance of the idea of the politeia. The Athenian ‘empire’ remained a deformed and 
lopsided defence. It is worth noting that the prime message of Thucydides’ account of 
the Peloponnesian war was that the cause of Athenian imperialism (and final defeat) was 
to be found in the breakdown of the virtues associated with the politeia. Thucydides’ 
hero is Pericles, who although he promoted Athenian glory, also stressed the moderation 
and civic (and xenophobic) pride that reappears in Aristotle’s account (Th. PW, Bk II). 
 There is another important link between Aristotle and the practice of the classical 
period of Herodotus and Thucydides. For all of them war is important for the polis, but 
war was a defensive necessity carried out by militias, not a profession linked to 
expansion. Thucydides has a number of his characters praise peace, and see war as a 
necessary evil, while Aristotle condemns aggression in all cases except defence (Th. PW, 
Bk IV; Ar. The Pol, Bk VII, ch. 2). Indeed, expansion, by increasing the population size and 
bringing in other ethnic groups, would destroy the very institution of the polis. This is 
Thucydides’ point. It crops up again in the Renaissance, where Machiavelli’s 
condemnation of the Augustinian Empire is based on his love of the Republican 
institutions that were undermined by imperial expansion. Interestingly, Machiavelli was 
also a great advocate of amateur militias (NM Dis, Bk I, 21; Bk II, 20. NM Pr, chs XII-
XIII). Perhaps, not surprisingly, it is in the institution of war, and the development of the 
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 See his discussion in Ar. Pol, Bk III, ch. 1. It is well to remember that Aristotle himself was a resident 
alien (metoikos) at Athens. 
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THE MACEDONIAN REVOLUTION 
 
 In 359 BC Philip II became ruler of Macedon, a kingdom north of Greece that 
was generally looked down on by Hellenes as a barbarous backwater. The Macedonian 
cavalry had received the praise of Thucydides, but its infantry – local levies armed with 
wicker shields and precious little training – were so useless that even Macedon’s rulers 
hardly relied on them (Th. PW, Bk II, 100). In 382 BC a Spartan general even advised 
King Amyntas of Macedon to hire mercenaries rather than rely on the Macedonian 
infantry (Hammond, 1994: 9). Philip, however, was a reformer. He had spent his youth 
as a hostage at Thebes, and was intent on modernising the army. Yet, Philip was no 
slavish copier of Greek practice. Rather, he used his Greek experience to develop a 
military machine superior to that of his Greek hosts. 
 The armies of the Greek poleis were based around the citizen heavy infantry, 
known as the hoplite. Formed into thick rectangles, or phalanxes, between six and 
twelve men deep, they were armed with long thrusting spears of about 2 to 2.5 metres 
(six to 7.5 feet) in length. The spears of the second rank would have projected beyond 
the shoulder of the rank in front, and thus the hoplite phalanx presented a formidable 
front of spearheads to its enemy. Battles were decided by a clash of phalanxes, although 
increasingly the armies also included light infantry, armed with throwing javelins or 
slings, to protect the flanks of the phalanx, and light cavalry for scouting and 
skirmishing. More than one military historian has posed the question: why did the 
Greeks rely on such an archaic system of arms? Heavy infantry is not well designed for 
shock combat, being slow and relying on a strict formation and drill that does not suit a 
sudden rush and clash of arms. Yet, this was exactly what the armies of the poleis did 
(Ferrill, 1997: 143-5). Herodotus puts an interesting criticism of the Greek hoplite 
system into the mouth of the Persian general Mardonius: ‘for when they have declared 
war against one another, having found out the fairest and most level spot, they go down 
to it and fight; so that the conquerors depart with great loss, and of the conquered… they 
are utterly destroyed’ (H. H, Bk VII, 9. Also quoted in Ferrill, 1997: 145). Of course, the 
lesson for Herodotus was the opposite of Mardonius’ speech. After all, Mardonius was 
defeated by a hoplite army at Plataea in 479 BC. Yet, despite the undeniable value of 
Greek heavy infantry, the exclusive use of hoplites seems to have less to do with 
military expertise, and more to do with the conservative this-is-the-way-we-have-
always-done-it attitude of the average Hellenic citizen (Ferrill, 1997: 144-5). This has 
also been linked to the requirements of Greek farming practices (Hanson, 1989; Hanson, 
1995; and Foxhall, 1993). 
With the exception of Sparta, which was ruled by a military caste, hoplites were 
predominantly small farmer-militiamen, who needed to return to their farms for the 
planting and harvest. As a result, wars were designed to be quick campaigns over 
specific issues. The armies of the classical polis were singly ill-suited for long 
campaigns, as the Athenians found out to their cost during their invasion of Sicily in 
415-3 BC. Not only were the hoplites needed to take up their occupations back home, 
they also required a large baggage train. Each hoplite took at least one servant with him 
to help maintain his equipment. This meant that at least half of an army was non-
combatant. An army’s speed and manoeuvrability is dictated by its size. The larger an 
army (including baggage train), the more supplies it consumes, and the longer it has to 
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spend on foraging and purchasing food and animal fodder (Engels, 1978: ch. 1). A larger 
army also slows down start and stop times. Anyone stuck in a traffic jam knows that 
movement at the head of a queue takes a long time to pass down the line. The larger the 
queue the longer this takes. Similarly, for an army strung out across the road, the time it 
takes to get everyone moving after a stop increases arithmetically with size (Engels, 
1978: Appendix 5). In addition to this, Greek armies had no commissariat, providing 
and organising a regular system of supply. ‘A relatively immobile, heavy army that has 
no commissariat, that lives off the land, most often dies on it, as did the Athenian army 
in Sicily’ (Ferrill, 1997: 146). In sum, the Greek way of war was suited to a conservative 
and non-imperial lifestyle. 
 The reforms of the Macedonian army had begun under Philip’s brother 
Alexander II, who had introduced the Greek hoplite system for the regular infantry 
(Hammond, 1994: 8-9). Philip was to carry these reforms further. First, he increased the 
length of the sarissa (pike) to probably about 5.4 metres (about 16 feet).8 This meant that 
it had to be wielded by both hands, and consequently the shield arm became immobile. 
Instead the phalanx relied on the bristle of pikes to protect itself from attack. A pike is 
not a weapon intended for single combat. It is only effective when part of a well-drilled 
unit. As a result, Philip relied on a professional army loyal only to him. This was made 
possible by the discovery and exploitation of gold and silver deposits. Philip’s phalanx 
could now be paid to be nothing but pikemen (or phalangites), rather than a militia with 
other professional considerations. Drilled until they formed a flexible and coherent unit, 
the Macedonian phalanx under Philip had no equal when attacked head-on. Indeed, the 
last Roman commander to face a Macedonian phalanx in the field, Aemilius Paulus, said 
that the sight of the phalanx in action had filled him with amazement and alarm(Pl. AP). 
 The Macedonian phalanx of Philip, unlike the hoplites of the Greeks, did not 
represent a self-standing unit, but was part of a combined arms army. While the phalanx 
had no equal in head-on confrontations, it was vulnerable to attack on the flank and rear. 
Philip, however, only envisioned it as one part of a larger system. The second arm of the 
new Macedonian system was based on Macedon’s own tradition of arms, its heavy 
cavalry. Philip had inherited a mounted bodyguard, drawn from the noble class, and 
called the hetairoi, or companions. These he changed into an effective heavy cavalry 
arm. The kernel of the new Macedonian way of war was to launch a cavalry charge on 
one of the wings, while the phalanx pinned the enemy centre. The shock cavalry charge 
would roll up one wing, and then the enemy centre would be simultaneously attacked by 
the cavalry in the flank and by the phalanx head-on.  In sum, the companion cavalry was 
to be the hammer to the phalanx’s anvil (Fuller, 1998: ch.2; Ferrill, 1997: 175ff. Philip 
had realised that the Greek tradition of heavy infantry, while poorly suited to shock 
attack, was well suited to defence against shock, and for coordination with a smaller 
flanking cavalry shock arm. 
 In addition to the phalanx and the shock companion cavalry, Philip also 
converted his foot bodyguard into an elite and mobile heavy infantry unit called the 
hypaspists, who could be used either to protect the flank of the phalanx, or as part of the 
shock attack on the enemy flank. Highly trained lighter peltasts9 and missile troops were 
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 See Connolly, 1998: 69 for a discussion of the size of the sarissa. 
9
 Unarmoured infantry armed with javelins. Their name derives from the small shield they carried, called 
a pelta. 
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added to protect the flank of the phalanx.10 Many of these lighter troops were drawn 
from various subject peoples and allies; and as Macedonia developed, its army became 
more multicultural. Since Macedonia had been an ethnically mixed polity from its 
origins, this idea of a multicultural army had deep roots in Macedonian military practice 
(Hammond,1994: 5. G. P. Baker has argued that this was actually a Carthaginian 
innovation. Baker, 1929: viii-ix). What Philip had created here was a system, based both 
on Greek and traditional Macedonian practice, that was an effective battlefield 
weapon.11 Yet, there was one other innovation to complete the Macedonian system. 
 Philip’s army was a brilliant tactical machine, but an army is also judged by its 
strategic manoeuvrability. One of the outstanding features of the campaigns of both 
Philip and Alexander was there ability to move with lightning speed. It was Philip’s 
speed during his campaign against the Athenians and Thebans, for example, that 
allowed him to cross the pass of Thermopylae before the Greeks had time to block it. 
The Macedonian military genius extended to the provision and organisation of supply. 
First, Philip limited the size of the non-combatant numbers in the army. Infantrymen 
were only allowed one servant for every ten men, while cavalry were restricted to one 
each. While a Greek army had consisted of over half non-combatants, the Macedonian 
army would have consisted of not more than a quarter non-combatants (Engels, 1978: 
12). This not only made the army easier to move, but also cut down the supplies needed 
to feed the army without reducing its power as a fighting force. Second, Philip outlawed 
wagons, and made his soldiers and their servants carry their own equipment and 
supplies.12 Carts had two major disadvantages. First, they were slow, unwieldy and 
liable to break down, particularly with the system of throat harnesses used in the ancient 
world. Second, they were limited to roads and good country, and could not be taken over 
rough terrain that makes up so much of the eastern Mediterranean (Engels, 1978: 15-6). 
Finally, the Macedonians seemed to have turned supply into a military art. Philip 
required his soldiers to take thirty days rations with them when they started out on 
campaign, thereby limiting the need to waste time foraging (Connolly, 1998: 69. The 
original source for this was Frontinus). According to Engel, the Macedonians must have 
also had a skilled commissariat. He points, as evidence of this, to the fast march rate of 
Alexander’s army (an average of 15 miles a day, with a high of almost 20 miles per 
day), and the nature of the terrain they traversed. An army of that size could not have 
met its supply requirements by forage alone. Rather it would have required a system of 
supply by sea, the purchase of supplies ahead of the army, and a system of control and 
dispersal second to none in the ancient world (1978: ch. 1). 
 Thus, under Philip the Macedonian army became a skilled and fast moving 
organisation that had been fine-tuned for successful conquest. Structurally Philip’s 
reforms produced a machine that worked under a different logic from the polis. Whereas 
in the polis value was conferred on people through their citizenship and by face-to-face 
elections for limited term magistracies, value in the Macedonian army was measured in 
terms of professional skill. Put differently, the Macedonian system of organisation rested 
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 Ferrill thinks that these lighter troops owed their genesis to Greek  and Macedonian copies of Persian 
light troops (1997: 180). 
11
 The influence of Persian and Near Eastern cavalry tactics was probably also important (Ferrill, 1997: 
ch. 5). 
12
 We owe this intelligence to Frontinus, writing in the first century AD (Fr. Str, Bk 4, 1,6). The same 
policy was introduced into the Roman army by Marius (Pl. M). 
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on a modern instrumental rationality that put a premium on competence, as opposed to a 
system that bases position on citizenship or blood-ties.  People who could offer a 
particular skill that was useful to the organisation gained status within it, although under 
Philip the vast bulk of these were Macedonians. Under Alexander this logic would lead 
to a more ethnically mixed organisation. Philip’s military organisation was also based on 
a segmented division of labour. The Greek hoplite armies, with very few exceptions, 
were based on a single type of soldier, and even the development of the lighter peltasts 
in the fourth century BC did not undermine this reliance on the hoplite. The Macedonian 
combined arms system was made up of a number of specialised types of unit, each one 
serving a different battlefield duty, and each one relying on its fellows to perform 
functions for it. Finally, whereas the loyalty of the citizen-hoplite was to the politeia, an 
abstract community given institutional form through a constitution seen as sacred, the 
Macedonian soldiery owed its allegiance to the idea of Macedonia made manifest in the 
person of the king. This was reinforced by the Macedonian tradition that the army was 
responsible for electing and confirming the succession. Thus, while the classical Greek 
citizen was loyal to a community of a particular shape and form, the Macedonian soldier 
was loyal to an idea that could change its form and purpose over time. 
 
 
FROM ARMY TO EMPIRE. THE ALEXANDRINE REVOLUTION 
 
 The conventional wisdom, backed up by extensive historical research, is that 
Philip never intended to create an empire to rival the Persian. His goal was the modest 
one of uniting the Greeks under his leadership, and liberating the Greek cities in Asia 
Minor that were under Persian rule. This may be true, although no one can really know 
what Philip would have done once he had defeated the Persians in Asia Minor. What we 
do know for sure is that Alexander did have a different vision in mind, but whether this 
matured over time, or whether it was always his goal we do not know. What we can say 
about Philip, however, is that the military machine he created worked. Alexander took it 
on a thirteen year campaign, and in the process created an empire. 
Alexander inherited not just the institutional framework of the army, he also 
inherited its professionalism. Philip had worked closely with, and groomed, a small 
number of top quality officers, who formed the original core of Alexander’s army. 
Some, like Antipater, were from the generation before Philip. Antipater’s skills at 
administration were such that Alexander made him regent of Macedonia in his absence, 
during which time Antipater led a successful campaign against the Spartans in 331 BC. 
Parmenion, who had to his credit the defeat of the Illyrians in the year of Alexander’s 
birth, was a contemporary of Philip and a master at the use of the Macedonian system. 
He was to be Alexander’s second in command (taking the left wing) in the three major 
battles against the Persians. Amongst the others, Antigonus Monophthalmos proved an 
effective general and governor in Anatolia, where he defeated the remnants of the 
Persian cavalry from the battle of Issus. Koenos served Alexander well as a unit 
commander, and Craterus was an effective field commander, and second in command 
after the execution of Parmenion. To this cadre left by Philip Alexander attached his 
boyhood friends, whom he had trained himself. These included a number who held 
commands later in Asia: Ptolemy, Perdiccas, Leonnatus, Hephaestion, Nearchus and 
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Erigyius. Erigyius, a close friend of Alexander’s, represents the shape of things to come. 
Unlike the others he was from Mytilene, a Greek city. Later the army would include a 
host of non-Macedonian commanders, of which Eumenes of Cardia was perhaps the 
most prominent. In short, the Macedonian army combined a powerful and complex 
military system with a superb officer class capable of excelling in both military and 
civilian administration.13 These acted as a staff council around Alexander, as well as a 
pool of generals that could be trusted with the increasingly frequent independent 
military and civil commands (Tarn, quoted in Fuller,1998: 52n). 
Although the historians of Alexander’s campaign were more interested in the drama of 
the conquest than mundane issues of day-to-day administration, we know enough from 
these sources to piece together the form and composition of the expedition. There are 
three elements of interest here, two of which are important to the transition from army to 
empire. First, and again in contrast to the Greeks, Alexander’s army had a large 
technical support section. Amongst the most important of these was the engineering 
corps -- commanded by the chief engineer, Diades of Thessaly, who was instrumental at 
the siege of Tyre. There were also experts in bridge-building and even people 
acquainted with the shipwright’s arts.14 In addition to this, the path of Alexander’s army 
was mapped out by surveyors, who were supplemented by effective scouting. Connolly 
sees this as a major departure from Greek practice. Classical Greek armies did little 
scouting, and history is full of examples of armies blundering around on campaign. By 
contrast, Alexander used a screen of scouts to give him information about the 
surrounding area.15 The surveyors would also be of crucial importance in the transition 
from a military to an imperial system. Throughout his new empire Alexander would 
copper-fasten his hold by establishing cities populated by veteran soldiers. Although 
Arrian and Curtius both mention Alexander personally laying out the new city of 
Alexandria-by-Egypt, given the complexity of town planning it is more likely that he 
left the more mundane decisions to his surveyors, while he took an active interest in the 
project as a whole. Curtius hints as much when he says that after marking out the 
boundaries he ‘left men to supervise construction of the city’ (Cur. Al, Bk IV, ch. 8; Arr. 
Al, Bk III, ch. 2. Plutarch largely follows Arrian’s account).We do know that the man 
left in charge was an architect by the name of Deinokrates (Tarn, quoted in Fuller, 1998: 
52). 
In addition to the technical support, Alexander also took along people who 
would be crucial for the long-term development of an imperial structure. These were the 
men of words, particularly historians and geographers. The role of the historians was 
                                                          
13
 An alternative view of the officer corps is offered by G. T. Griffith, who claims that it was Alexander, 
not Philip, who developed the cadre of Macedonian officers. Griffith claims that really only Parmenion 
distinguished himself as a general under Philip, and that Philip’s strong hands-on approach to the army 
prevented others getting good command experience under him (Griffith, 1992: 58-77). 
14
 Hephaestion, for example, bridged the Indus, possibly with Perdiccas (Arr. Al, Bk V, ch. 4; Cur. Al, Bk 
8, chs 10 and 12). Both Curtius and Arrian refer to the building of a large fleet on the Indus, although the 
details are tantalizingly sparse. (Arr. Al, Bk VI, ch. 1; Cur. Al, Bk IX, ch. 3). Griffith argues that this 
engineering competence was a product of Philip’s reforms, and was key to Philip’s successes against the 
cities in the northern Aegean (Griffith, 1992: 59-62). 
15Connolly, 1998: 72-3. For example, according to Arrian just before the battle of the Granicus Alexander 
sent out ‘scouts ahead of the army, under the command of Amyntas, son of Arrabaeus, with the squadron 
of Companion cavalry from Apollonia under Socrates, son of Sathon, and four squadrons of what were 
known as advanced scouts’ (Arr. Al, Bk I, ch. 12). 
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both to record the campaign for posterity, and to construct a philosophy of empire on the 
march. The first of these was important to ancient Greeks and Macedonians, as it is to 
modern propagandists (Thucydides, for example, has Pericles declare in his funeral 
oration that Athens’ glory will outlive it in the lasting memorials to its spirit of 
adventure (Th. PW, Bk II, 41)). Indeed, one of the campaign historians – Aristobolus – 
was the major ancient (but now lost) source for the history of the campaign. To him and 
Ptolemy we owe the strongly pro-Alexander history of Arrian. The geographers were a 
new development that also linked directly to empire. Geography is a fundamentally 
imperial academic discipline, linked as it is to mapping territory for the purposes of 
control. It is interesting to note that it was hardly practiced by the classical Greeks (why 
map a region that a face-to-face community knows and agrees to by tradition?) In the 
modern age the big boost to the growth of geography and cartography was the 
development of the territorial state, and its need for centralised control for military and 
tax purposes. The same went for Alexander’s geographers. Alexander’s campaign was 
also a mission of exploration designed to map and control. When Nearchus was 
dispatched by Alexander up the Persian Gulf, for example, it was with instructions to 
record the nature of the lands thereabout (Cur. Al, Bk IX, ch. 10 and Bk X, ch. 1; Arr. 
Al, Bk VI, ch. 20 and 28). Modern writers have found the distances recorded by 
Alexander’s geographers, which survive in the later writings of Strabo and Pliny, 
remarkably accurate (Engels, 1978: 4).16 
Finally, either Alexander or Philip had altered the army structure to make the 
army more effective against a Persian foe. Fighting against heavy infantry armies, 
Philip’s forces had been made up mainly of infantry, with just enough heavy cavalry to 
envelop the enemy’s left flank. The Persian armies were made up of mainly medium and 
light infantry, with a high reliance on archers, and larger amounts of highly trained 
cavalry. At Chaeronea in 338 BC Philip’s ratio of infantry to cavalry when facing a 
hoplite army was 30 to 1. By contrast, at the start of Alexander’s Asian campaign in 334 
BC that ratio was 6 to 1 (Santosuosso, 1997: 167-8). In terms of the development of an 
imperial ethic this reveals a crucial factor in the success of the Macedonian system: its 
ability to adapt to changing situations and opponents as the conquest took it to new 
challenges. A conservative defensive army can get by with little innovative change as 
long as it fights on the same terrain against similar foes (the hoplite system, despite the 
addition of light troops, had not changed in its essentials in about four centuries). An 
army that wishes to fight different systems over vastly different territory must be able to 
adapt and change. So, before leaving the Macedonians had already altered the structure 
of their forces in order to guarantee that their flanking strategy could still be effective 
against a different kind of foe. Since the Persians had a strong cavalry presence it was 
necessary for the Macedonians to counteract this with a stronger shock force. Similar 
innovations were to occur on the hoof. For example, coming up against elephants for the 
first time at the battle of the Hydaspes (Jhelum) Aexander made good use of horse 
archers -- recruited from peoples formerly subject to Persia, and unknown in a 
Macedonian army until the conquest -- to soften up the Indian left before the heavy 
cavalry assault. When the heavy cavalry had weakened (but not dislodged) the Indian 
left he used the phalanxes, with their shields locked, as a means of breaking the now 
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 It has to be noted, however, that despite the promotion of geography and surveying, Ancient maps 
remained primitive by modern standards. 
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disorganised Indian elephants and cavalry (Arr. Al, Bk V, chs 17-18). By altering the 
ratios of troop types, and sometimes adding new ones, the Macedonian army guaranteed 
that it could adapt to any strategic and tactical novelty. 
While the army proved the essential tool for empire-building, it was in his 
development of a corresponding imperial ethics that Alexander’s legacy is 
simultaneously at its most enduring and most (at least for its time) controversial. While 
the development of the Macedonian army system was a combination of Greek practice, 
Macedonian traditions and Philip’s own innovations; the Alexandrine imperial doctrine 
was a mix of Macedonian military form, Persian imperial practice and Alexander’s own 
spark of divinity. Before proceeding it is probably important to mention the role of 
Persia here. One could counter my suggestion that the Macedonians invented the 
western conception of political organisation by pointing out the earlier precedent of the 
Persian Empire. Certainly, many of the important parts of Macedonian imperial practice 
in the Hellenistic period were borrowed from the Persians. While the role of the Persians 
in the development of our idea of empire, especially their place in the idea of empire 
developed by Alexander and, later, Seleucus, is important, we must keep in mind that 
until Alexander no elements of the Persian imperial system were deemed exportable. 
Certainly Persian military doctrine had no real effect on its neighbours in India or 
Greece, and Persian imperial administration did not provide the basis of either Athenian 
or Spartan hegemony. Thus, what we inherited from the Achaemenid Persians was 
mediated through the Macedonians. This does not mean that the Persian system was 
somehow inferior (after all, Alexander and his successors did not think so, judging by 
their desire to copy Persian custom in the teeth of the xenophobia of their followers), 
only that it took Alexander to turn it into an exportable political ethics. In this sense, our 
Persian legacy is tied up inextricably with the Macedonian. We see this as well in the 
development of the later Iranian empires of Pontus, Parthia and Sassanid Persia, all three 
of which drew freely from earlier Macedonian precedents. 
The imperial ethics of Alexander were a product of the army structure itself. The 
political system was based on individual ability, rather than citizenship or kinship ties. 
Certainly, many of Alexander’s appointments were given to close personal friends, yet 
even here Alexander seems to have chosen his friends well, and all seemed suited to the 
responsibilities that he gave them. Friendship, however, was never a crucial deciding 
factor in appointments, and even Alexander’s closest friend, Hephaestion, was restricted 
to commands that reflected his modest abilities. Perhaps the most serious of Alexander’s 
lapses of judgement in regards to his friends was in his appointment of Harpalus as 
treasurer. Guilty of desertion before the battle of Issus, and later of squandering money 
while Alexander was in India, Harpalus organised an abortive insurrection in Athens 
(Arr. Al, Bk III, ch. 6; Diodorus Siculus, Bk XVII, ch. 108). More interesting is the 
extent that his choices for senior positions went to people outside of the close circle of 
his friends. Parmenion, his father’s general, was chosen as his second in command. 
Alexander’s choice for the key satrapy of Phrygia was Antigonus Monophthalmos, 
while the regency went to Antipater, both old war horses of his father’s time. Early on 
key technical jobs went to skilled Greeks, such as the engineer Diades of Thessaly or 
Alexander’s secretary, and eventually general, Eumenes of Cardia. All of these excelled 
in their positions. Soon after his invasion Alexander also began to appoint and reappoint 
certain key Persians to former Persian satrapies. Some of these were grave 
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disappointments (having betrayed one king, some thought little of betraying another), 
others great successes. Artabazus was perhaps the best of the Persians in Alexander’s 
imperial administration. He and his family proved invaluable to Alexander in his 
Bactrian campaigns.  
Despite anecdotal failures, this process does represent the victory of an 
instrumental rationality over the ties of friendship, blood and culture within the 
Macedonian system of organisation. There was also another spin-off from this system of 
putting competence ahead of tradition. Aristotle in particular and the Hellenic polis in 
general, saw no political role for women. In fact, as Michael Grant makes clear, in the 
wealthier strata of Athenian society they were frequently segregated and hidden in 
separate women’s quarters(1992: 5-6). By contrast, the Hellenistic world created by 
Alexander’s conquests was more accepting of women in public life, even if the numbers 
of women in positions in power was still minute. Part of this went back to pre-Philippian 
Macedonia, where the pastoral nature of society required women to be directly involved 
in economic activity, and part may be due to the role of Alexander’s mother, Queen 
Olympias, who despite her poor reputation in later histories, commanded the loyalties of 
many Macedonians. Yet, a larger part of the explanation lies in the Hellenistic 
acceptance of any ruler as long as they were competent. The Seleucid queen Cleopatra 
Thea, and the Ptolemaic Cleopatra VII attracted the loyalty of their male subordinates 
through administrative and political genius. Lower down the social scale, women could 
own property in their own right,17 and many became literary, artistic and intellectual 
figures, like Phile of Priene, who designed and built a reservoir and an aqueduct (Grant, 
1992: 24). Obviously, too much can be made of these examples. Society still remained 
male dominated. On the other hand, however, there is no doubt that the idea of the 
superiority of competence in the world Alexander had created allowed some extremely 
gifted women to excel in a way that they never could have in Aristotle’s narrow polis. 
The issue of the use of Persian noblemen brings up the cornerstone of 
Alexander’s new imperial policy. The new empire was to be a multicultural one, linking 
together especially the three key ethnic groups of the Macedonians, Greeks and 
Persians. Part of this multiculturalism was just passive good sense. An Egyptian was 
given civil control in Egypt, cities both Greek and non-Greek in Asia Minor were 
allowed to keep their self-government, Persians were retained in certain satrapies, and 
Indian rulers like Taxiles and Porus continued to rule their kingdoms as Alexandrine 
protectorates. Yet, for the practical reason that there just were not enough Macedonians 
and Greeks to govern the whole Empire, as Fuller notes (1998: 272), this passive policy 
was not enough. Alexander’s charm offensive with the Persian nobility was designed to 
give them a stake in his Empire, and to furnish him with a larger pool of potential 
soldiers and administrators. 
The policy of fusion between the Macedonian and Persian nobility began with 
changes to court etiquette. In order to make Persians feel more comfortable Alexander 
introduced the Persian custom of prostration to the King (proskynesis). This was 
resented by the Macedonians and Greeks. It was also instrumental in Alexander’s 
drunken argument with his close friend Black Clitos. Alexander’s killing of Clitos, and 
his deep-seated regret afterwards, demonstrates the tensions between Alexander’s roles 
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 Compare this to fifth century Athens, where women citizens were required to have a male guardian, or 
kyrios, throughout their lives (Murray, 1988: 206). 
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as Macedonian chieftain and Lord of Asia (Arr. Al, Bk IV, chs 8-13. See also Curtius’ 
more damning account of Alexander’s ‘orientalism’ in Cur. Al. Bk VIII, ch. 5). Tensions 
were also raised when Alexander adopted Persian and Median dress in public (Arr. Al, 
Bk IV, ch. 8). In 324 BC Alexander pulled off his greatest feat of multicultural 
integration when he arranged the wedding of his close Macedonian companions with the 
daughters of senior Persian noblemen, including his own marriage to a daughter of 
Darius (Arr. Al, Bk VII, chs 4-5; Cur. Al, Bk X, ch. 3). Tellingly, after Alexander’s 
death most of the Macedonians repudiated their Persian wives. A notable exception was 
Seleucus, but Seleucus inherited most of Alexander’s eastern empire after the wars of 
succession, and continued much of Alexander’s imperial policy as well. Alexander’s 
integration of 30,000 Iranian troops, armed in the Macedonian manner, in either the 
same year as the weddings or 327 BC, completed the process of creating a 
fundamentally multicultural army. According to Arrian Alexander called these youths 
his ‘inheritors’ (epigoni), and to the annoyance of the Macedonians, placed them on an 
equal footing with the rest of the army (Arr. Al, Bk VII, ch. 6). Alexander’s final act of 
reconciliation with the Persians was his appointment of Peucestas as satrap of Persia. 
Not only was Peucestas a loyal supporter of Alexander, but more importantly he was a 
Macedonian who had taken it upon himself to learn Persian and adopt Persian dress 
(Arr. Al, Bk VII, ch. 6-7). Peucestas, after raising Persian troops for the army, is later 
congratulated by Alexander for his orderly rule of Persia (Arr. Al, Bk. VII, ch. 23). 
Although death was to cut short Alexander’s policy of integration it is clear, to quote 
Fuller that: 
 
His empire was to be neither Greek, nor Macedonian, nor Asiatic, it was 
to be Alexandrian. In its conception there are no traces of Aristotle’s 
ideas, and it went far beyond those of Isocrates, who never dreamt of 
raising Asiatics to Partnership with Greeks. It broke with the basic 
conceptions of the Hellenic world, and substituted for them a new world 
outlook (1998: 272). 
 
 The two pillars of individual ability and multiculturalism were joined by a third 
element in the ethics of Alexander’s Empire: the segmented nature of government. Just 
as the army was based on a number of specialised mutually dependent units, so 
Alexander’s imperial government was constructed out of a number of different forms of 
government, in which Alexander played different roles. To the Macedonian army he was 
their companion-King – a leader who had been chosen by them, and whose role as 
commander-in-chief never completely blotted out his place as their ‘first amongst 
equals’. To the Greeks of the Balkan peninsula he was the commander-in-chief of the 
League of Corinth, and their ally. To the Asiatic Greeks, and many independent non-
Greek cities and kingdoms, he was ally and liberator, to the Egyptians he was a god-
king, while to the Persians he was their direct (but mortal) sovereign. In the eastern part 
of the old Persian Empire Alexander had separated military and civil responsibility (this 
was supplemented by putting the key fortresses of Sardes, Tyre, Gaza, Pelusium, 
Memphis and Babylon under the control of Macedonian commanders separate from the 
satrapy system (Fuller, 1998: 268)). When Satibarzanes was reconfirmed as satrap of 
Aria Alexander also sent Anaxippus with forty men as ‘guards’ (Arr. Al, Bk III, ch. 25). 
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Similarly, when Amminapes was made satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania, Tlepolemus, one 
of the Companions, was appointed to the military command (Arr. Al, Bk III, ch. 22). 
Given the questionable loyalty, although undeniable skill, of these converted satraps this 
seems to have been a deliberate strategy to prevent revolt (in the case of Satibarzanes the 
precaution did not work. The new satrap murdered Anaxippus and rose in rebellion). 
Much of this system had evolved as a response to local conditions, but it reflected the 
point that the Alexandrine imperial system was always different things to different 
peoples. As new local conditions were confronted Alexander adapted his political 
strategy accordingly. Thus, unlike the static and atemporal truths of Aristotle’s politeia, 
the imperium of Alexander was a mutable and changing political community. A similar 
approach was to be taken a few generations later by the Romans, who mixed alliances, 
direct rule, protectorates and full citizenship in order to create a stable and more lasting 
imperial legacy. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the British Empire also 
combined a mix of dominion-status, self-governing colonies, non-self-governing 
colonies, protectorates and dependencies. 
 Linked to this policy of segmented government was Alexander’s near-mania for 
building cities. Alexander’s civic foundations were designed to form part of the glue of 
empire. The foundation of cities as the basis of forward defence had been a policy of 
Philip (who founded, amongst others, Philippopolis – modern Plovdiv – in Thrace), and 
an earlier suggestion of Isocrates as a means of controlling Asiatic territory. Settled by a 
mix of veterans and local people, these cities preserved the form of Greek city life, but 
were under the control of the Royal administration. Their Greek character can be seen 
from the excavations at Ai Khanoum in Afghanistan, where a Greek gymnasion and 
fragments of philosophical texts have been found (Fox, 1988: 334, and the picture on 
360). The most lasting and successful of Alexander’s foundations is obviously 
Alexandria-By-Egypt, which was the capital of the Ptolemaic Empire until 30 BC. 
 In all, the Alexandrine legacy was a combination of factors that would prove a 
successful part of the Western system of social organisation. The ideas of individualism 
based on competence, of multiculturalism, of a segmented government with different 
specialised departments linked through mutual dependence, of a spatially based political 
order mapped out by surveyors, and of the prime importance of adaptability in a world 
made uncertain by the very practice of the imperial logic are all direct descendants of 
Alexander’s military organisation and imperial ethics. 
 
 
ALEXANDER’S LEGACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
IDEA OF THE WEST 
 
 It is important to reiterate the point made in the introduction that, rather than 
representing a single ideology, Alexander’s imperialism has always been a coin with 
two sides. Yes, it is a means of conquest and imperial control, but it has also been its 
opposite in the form of a pacific cosmopolitanism. Both of these incompatible ideas are 
contained in the legacy. What unites them is a rejection of the narrow (both territorially 
and socially) conservative world of Aristotle, although Aristotle’s legacy still breathes in 
the worlds of the small town conservative and the ethno-nationalist. 
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 Perhaps the first group to take up this more radical interpretation of empire were 
the stoics, who openly preached Alexander’s cherished idea of multiculturalism, 
sometimes combined with a hatred of the injustice of war: ‘The splendour of this 
hopeless dream may remind us that not one but two of the great lines of socio-political 
thought that have divided the world since go back to Alexander of Macedon’ (Tarn, 
1953: 437). Stoicism’s yearning for a perfect society uniting all humanity became 
associated with the Roman Empire in the first century BC, and formed the basis of 
Marcus Aurelius’ ‘idea of Rome’ quoted in the film Gladiator. This, in turn, became a 
pillar of the post-Saint Augustine Catholic Church, and was rediscovered as a secular 
yearning by the Enlightenment, and its intellectual children liberalism and socialism. In 
this sense, the idea of a universal set of human rights is as much part of the legacy of 
Alexander as is the idea of a formal imperialism. 
 Less radical in intent is the legacy of political organisation. Whereas the classical 
Greek polis, and its system of direct face-to-face control in an extremely small 
community, says little to us in terms of our organisational experience, anyone who has 
worked in the modern public or private sector would immediately recognise the army 
and empire of Alexander as a system that they are familiar with. Its ideas of specialised 
departments, power through competence, rampant individualism contained within a 
single minded organisation, the importance of adaptability, a dominant instrumental 
rationality, and a clear chain of command have all survived the millennia as the basis of 
western organisation. The great captains of industry in the twentieth century – Henry 
Ford, Lord Beaverbrook, George Soros, Richard Branson or Bill Gates – have 
demonstrated management styles that owe more to Alexander than they do to Pericles. 
Even anarchism, often seen as the opposite of this form of political organisation, is 
drawn more from the Alexandrine than the Aristotelian tradition. Anarchism’s 
conception of organisation uses the same idea of instrumental rationality and 
competence, but frames it in an egalitarian and libertarian view of political community. 
Ideas of topless federations and cooperatively run institutions have served to 
democratise the idea of imperial organisation. Aristotle’s notion of civic virtue within a 
static and xenophobic order has little in common with the individualistic and 
cosmopolitan ideas associated with Kropotkin and Proudhon 
 Were does this leave us? Just as capitalism, according to Marx, reordered the 
world so that there was no going back to feudalism, so Alexandrine imperialism has 
closed off a return to the polis. Yet, we should not interpret this as a backward step. 
Capitalism in Marx’s view opened up a space for global socialism, so the new 
Alexandrine world offered us the chance to embrace ideas of progress and cultural 
diversity.  The conservative world of Aristotle is no doubt emotionally more secure – 
there are no confusions about identity or our place in the world – but it is also a lower 
order existence. It lacks challenge and the potential to change and develop, even though 
those challenges and potential often threaten to end in personal disaster. There is no 
place in Aristotle for self-creation, but similarly there is a strong and comforting social 
cohesion. Alexander has made the western mind lonelier and less secure, but he has also 
allowed it to imagine different worlds. The origins of this new political life lie, 
ironically, in innovations in military organisation. In this sense, our modern notions of 
organisation and instrumental rationality are products of war. This should not surprise 
us. Security, rather than prosperity, has always been the first concern of political 
  
17 
communities. Therefore it makes sense that the first, and paradigmatic, state institution 
should be the army. Instrumental rationality is a bequest to, not an invention of, the 
market. 
For good or ill we are all children of Alexander. On his deathbed Alexander is 
reputed to have said (although it is certainly apocryphal) that there would be great 
funeral games after his death (Cur. Al, Bk X, ch. 5). Indeed there have been. We still 
chase his ideal. Some, in the past, have seen themselves as powerful conquerors, while 
others have taken to heart his idea of a cosmopolis. Both are united in a desire to 
recreate an ideal that they may not even consciously link to the Macedonian. What is 





A Note on Sources and References 
The Limerick papers in Politics and Public Administration use the Harvard system of 
referencing. While this is fine for much political science research, it works less well for 
classic texts, where there may be many different editions and translations. It is usually 
easier to quote the internationally recognised book, chapter and section numbers, which 
are standard to all editions of the same work. Since this paper makes strong use of works 
by ancient authors I have used the standard referencing system when quoting from them. 
I shall also be using the following abbreviations: 
 
 
Ar. Pol Aristotle, The Politics. 
 
Ar. NA  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. 
 
Arr. Al  Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander. 
 
Cur. Al  Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander. 
 
DS. H  Diodorus Siculus, History. 
 
Fr. Str  Frontinus, Strategematica. 
 
H. H  Herodotus, Histories. 
 
NM Dis Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses. 
 
NM Pr  Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. 
 
Pl. AP  Plutarch, Life of Aemilius Paulus. 
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When using Greek and Macedonian names in the text I have used the most common 
English usage (which usually derives from the Latin version). Where there is no 
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